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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 





MELVIN JAMES WORKMAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Melvin James Workman, was charged 
with rape, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-402 (1953), as amended, and aggravated burglary, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-203 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by the Honorable Ernest F. 
Badlwin, Jr., sitting without a jury, and was found guilty of 
rape and burglary in the Third Judicial District Court for 
Salt Lake County. Appellant was sentenced to serve an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than 
fifteen years for both offenses, which sentence was to run 
consecutively. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks af f irmance of the conviction 
in the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At trial, the State called several witnesses, 
the most important of whom, for purposes of this brief 
were Deana English, the victim, Catherine Workman, 
defendant's mother, and Connie Riley, a friend of the 
defendant. Prior to the selection of the jury, which 
had been called and was present in the courtroom, 
appellant indicated his desire to be tried by Judge 
Baldwin instead of a jury. 
Deana English testified that on February 19, 
1979, she was awakened at about 1:00 a.m. by a man who had 
entered her apartment at 3378 South Fifth East. The man 
placed his hand over her mouth and told her that he had 
a gun. She was also told not to scream (Tr.15,18). 
Almost immediately the man turned her on her stomach and 
placed a pillow over her head. The pillow was held there 
by her assailant during the remainder of the assault. 
After several attempts the victim was raped (Tr.23). 
After the act of intercourse was completed the 
victim began to scream. Her assailant, upon hearing 
-2-
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the screaming, ilt\Inediately left the apartment (Tr.23). 
Deana English was unable to identify the appellant at 
trial due to the fact that she did not have an opportunity 
to see her assailant. However, she testified that some ten 
to fifteen minutes after her assailant left she observed a 
wallet on the floor of her apartment. She testified that 
· this wailet was not hers, and that it did not belong in her 
apartment, and that it was not in her apartment when she had 
gone to bed (Tr.27,28). 
Mrs. Catherine Workman, appellant's mother, was 
called as a witness and identified the wallet and its 
contents as belonging to appellant, Melvin Workman (Tr.152). 
Connie Riley testified to three telephone conversation 
she had had with the appellant, his mother, and his brother, 
Jim Workman. The last telephone conversation occurred around 
7:30 a.m., February 19, 1979, and was initially between 
Catherine Workman and Connie Riley (Tr.88,89). Connie 
Riley testified that during this conversation the telephone 
was passed back and forth between appellant and his 
mother. During this conversation, Connie Riley was 
informed that the appellant-had entered an apartment and 
had raped a woman~ The method used to accomplish the rape 
was described, and she was also informed that money had 
-3-
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been taken from a wallet in the living room, that a 
flashlight had been dropped and later recovered, and 
other facts which could only have been known by the 
individual who had committed the rape {Tr.90-92). 
At the conclusion of the State's case, 
appellant elected not to put on evidence {Tr.175-177). 
Prior to trial, however, appellant had duly filed a 
notice of his intention to claim the defense of alibi. 
In this notice, he indicated that. at the time of the rape 
of Deana English he was at his residence with his mother, 
and had been there from 11:30 p.m. on February 18, 1979, 
until the following morning. Catherine Workman, appellant's 
mother, was listed as his alibi witness {R.48). Mrs. 
Workman was subpoenaed by the State and was available at 
trial to so testify. 
On October 18, 1979, appellant duly filed a motion 
for disclosure of exculpatory material {R.50). Pursuant to 
this motion, on November 19, 1979, the State informed the 
appellant of the following: 
1. That Kevin Mcclosky from the Center for Human 
Toxicology had submitted a report which indicated that the 
hair found in the bedsheets and pillow cases of the victim 
was different from the hair taken from appellant's head. 
A copy of the Mcclosky report was given to appellant's 
counsel at that time. 
_jf_ 
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2. That dirt taken from the clothing that 
appellant said he was wearing at the time of the incident 
was not similar to the dirt taken from the victim's 
residence. 
3. That Mrs. Workman had called the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office and had reported that appellant 
had been robbed in the parking lot of Devereaux's Bar and 
that during the robberyhiswallet had been taken (R.58,59). 
On May 8, 1979, a preliminary hearing was held 
before the Honorable Robert Gibson, Circuit Court Judge. 
At this hearing appellant called Virgil Johnson, the 
Deputy Salt Lake County Sheriff assigned to the investiga-
tion of this case. During the questioning of Detective 
Johnson, the appellant learned· that Connie Riley would be 
called to testify at trial (Preliminary Hearing Transcript,· 
77). Appellant's counsel at the hearing was informed that 
appellant admitted entering the victim's apartment, taking 
money, and leaving his wallet in the apartment. He was not 
told of the circumstances surrounding the rape itself 
{Preliminary Hearing Transcript, 78). During the questioning 
of Detective Johnson, appellant was also informed of the 
following facts concerning .the case: 
1. That the victim indicated that the assailant 
possibly had a beard. 
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2. The results of the analysis of the hair 
taken by Kevin Mcclosky. 
3. That a second analysis had been made of the 
hair samples by Peter Barnett of Forensic Science Associates 
which indicated the hair to be similar to appellant's hair. 
4. That soil samples were taken from the victim's 
residence and appellant's residence, that these soil samples 
were compared with soil taken from appellant's clothing, and 
that the results showed that the soil from appellant's clothing 
was similar to soil taken from his own residence. 
5. That a timed run had been made between the 
victim's residence and the appellant's residence. 
6. That the first telephone call received by 
the Sheriff's Office from Mrs. Workman reporting the theft 
of appellant's wallet was received at 1:14 a.m. on February 
19' 1979. 
· 7. All physical evidence from the scene which 
included a tank top and a piece of paper with the 
defendant's telephone number on it (Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript, 59-77). 
Several weeks prior to trial, appellant's trial 
counsel, Robert Van Seiver, and Deputy County Attorney Lynn 
Payne, who prosecuted the case at trial, had a casual 
conversation in the halls of the courts building. To the 
-6-
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best recollection of Mr. Payne, Mr. Van Seiver asked if 
he (Mr. Van Sciver)"knew everything," and Mr. Payne told 
him that he did know everything. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE 
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO DISCLOSE 
APPELLANT'S INCULPATORY STATEMENTS; 
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL. 
The law on the subject of when the withholding 
of evidence by the prosecution denies a defendant due 
process of law has been set down by the United States 
Supreme Court, which has enunciated the standard for 
determining whether there has been a violation of due 
process in a state's criminal prosecution. In the 
seminal case of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
the defendant, prior to trial, had requested the 
prosecution to allow him to examine a co-defendant's 
extrajudicial statements. Several statements were 
shown to the defendant, but one, in which the co-
defendant admitted the actual killing, was withheld 
by the prosecution and did not come to the attention 
of the defense until after trial and after appeal. 
The Supreme Court established in Brady the basic principle 
that suppression of material evidence by the prosecution 
which is favorable to an accused upon request violates 
due process. 
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This Court, in State v. Jarrell, Utah, 608 P.2d 
218 (1980), described the holding of the United States 
Supreme Court in Brady as follows: 
• . . the [United States Supreme] Court 
held that the prosecutorial suppression of 
evidence favorable to the accused, in the 
face of a specific request for the evidence, 
violates due process if the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment. 
608 P.2d at 224 (emphasis added). Central to a finding 
of violation of due process in a case of prosecutorial 
suppression of evidence under Brady, then, is the favorable 
nature of the evidence to the accused. 
In a more recent case, Moore v. Illinois, 408 
U.S. 786 (1972), reh. den. 409 U.S. 897 (1972), the Supreme 
Court reviewed the important elements of Brady and stated: 
The heart of the holding in Brady is 
the prosecution's suppression of evidence, 
in the face of a defense production request, 
where the evidence is favorable to the accused 
and is material either to guilt or to punish-
· ment. Important then, are a) suppression by 
the prosecution after a request by the defense, 
b) the evidence's favorable character for the 
defense, and c) the materiality of the evidence. 
These are the standards by which the prosecution's 
conduct in Moore's case is to be measured. 
408 U.S. at 794, 795 (emphasis added). 
The case of United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 
(1976) extended the rulings of the Supreme Court in Brady and 
Moore. In Agurs, the Court held that a prosecutor has a 
constitutional duty to volunteer obviously exculpatory evidence 
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and evidence that is so clearly supportive of a claim of 
innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty 
to produce to the defense that which is unknown and unrequested 
by the defense. The Supreme Court held that due process 
is violated if the undisclosed evidence would have, if 
disclosed, created a reasonable doubt as to defendant's 
guilt. The Agurs Court further determined that whether 
the evidence created a reasonable doubt must be evaluated 
in light of the entire record as viewed by an appellate 
court. The proper standard of materiality of the undisclosed 
evidence established by the Supreme Court in Agurs is that 
if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt of guilt 
that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has 
been committed if it is suppressed. Finally, if " 
there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not 
the additional evidence is considered, there is no 
j ustif ica ti on for a new trial. " 42 7 U.S. at 112, 113. 
Therefore, undisclosed evidence, to be considered material 
and to thereby come within the ambit of Brady, Moore, and 
Agurs, must be exculpatory. Appellant's undisclosed 
statements were inculpatory and the fact of their 
nondisclosure did·not constitute a violation of due 
process under the standards set forth by the United 
States Supreme Court, particularly in the absence of a 
showing that the suppressed evidence was favorable to the 
accused. 
-9-
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This Court, in State v. Jarrell, supra, was 
confronted with the issue of suppression of evidence by 
the prosecution. In Jarrell, the defendant's contention 
was that two police reports withheld by the prosecution 
contained information which would have tended to execulpate 
him; allegedly, the reports would have been helpful for both 
impeachment and cross-examination purposes. The defendant 
in Jarrell claimed that he did not become aware of the 
existence of the police reports until after the trial, in 
spite of the fact that both officers specifically referred 
to the reports during their testimony. This Court rejected 
the defendant's contention that the-~secution's nondisclosure 
of the police investigative reports rec}uired that the 
defendant be granted a new trial. 
Appellant characterizes this Court's decision in 
Jarrell as resting most heavily on the fact of the absence of 
any indication that the defendant sought discovery of the 
police reports; appellant thereby leaves out the other 
central factor relied on by this Court, that the reports 
in question did not appear to raise a reasonable doubt as to 
the defendant's guilt. This Court held that not only is the 
prosecutor not required to disclose all evidence which 
might possibly be useful to the defense but which is not 
likely to have a forseeable effect on the verdict, but that 
generally, evidence,~as not been improperly withheld in a 
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criminal proceeding if the defense has knowledge of such 
evidence and defense counsel simply fails to request it. 
Because the undisclosed inculpatory evidence in no way 
raised a reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt, 
appellant's claim that he was deprived of a fair trial 
by the nondisclosure of his inculpatory statements 
suffers from the same fatal flaw inherent in State v. 
Jarrell, supra. 
Several other Utah cases have recognized that to 
vitiate a conviction on suppression of evidence grounds, 
the evidence suppressed must have tended to clear the 
defendant and be exculpatory in nature; in other words, 
that the evidence, if not suppressed, must have tended to 
establish the defendant's innocence, and that it would 
have been helpful and not harmful to him if admitted at 
trial. Butt v. Graham, 6 Utah 2d 133, 307 P.2d 892 (1957); 
ward v. Turner, 12 Utah 2d 310, 366 P.2d 72 (1961), cert. 
den. 371 U. s. 872 (1962). 
In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, 
this Court has stated: "Error will not be presumed nor can 
we presume misconduct on the part of counsel •.•• " State 
v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764 at 771 (1949). More-
over, this Court has repeatedly stated that great deference 
will be given to the judgment of the trial court. In State v. 
Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974), this Court 
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ti 
Due to his advantaged position and 
consistent with his responsibilties as the 
authority in charge of the trial, the inquiry 
is necessarily addressed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court • • • Inasmuch 
as this is his primary responsibility, when 
he has given due consideration and ruled 
upon the matter, this court on review should 
not upset his ruling unless it clearly appears 
that he has abused his discretion. 
517 P.2d at 1324. This Court has in fact noted a 
presumption, in non-jury cases, that the trial judge 
disregards any improper material: 
The court, sitting without a jury, 
is presumed to have disregarded any 
irrelevant, immaterial or other evidence 
not pertinent to.the issue. 
State v. Burke, 102 Utah 249, 129 P.2d 560 (1942). 
In the instant case, where Judge Baldwin 
denied appellant's motion for a mistrial, and where there 
is no showing that the undisclosed evidence was exculpatory 
and/or material, appellant was not denied due process, and 
this Court should not upset the trial court's denial of 
appellant's motion for a mistrial. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE 
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE 
APPELLANT'S INCULPATORY STATEMENTS AND 
WAS NOT THEREBY DENIED A FAIR TRIAL, 
PARTICULARLY WHERE HE HAD PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING THE ADMISSIONS. 
In the case of State v. Moraine, 25 Utah 2d 51, 475 
P.2d 831 (1970), the Utah Supreme Court held it was not error 
for the prosecuting attorney to fail to disclose in a bill 
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of particulars admissions of the defendant concerning an 
armed robbery. In so doing the court seemed to indicate that 
the defendant could not claim surprise where he had personal 
knowledge concerning the admissions: 
Where the court orders the prosecuting 
attorney in a bill of particulars to give 
matters not required by the statute, the 
court may excuse the failure to furnish 
such material by permitting the evidence 
to be introduced, as was done in this case. 
Besides, if anyone knew about the statement, 
it surely was the defendant himself. 
Id. at 833. For a similar result see State v. Adams, Utah, 
583 P.2d 89 (1978), wherein the defendant was not informed 
of an admission made to a police officer: 
In regard to defendant's final point: 
That prejudicial error was committed because 
the prosecution did not disclose to him that it 
intended to use the testimony of Officer Reit 
concerning defendant's admission, this is to be 
said: We are in agreement with the proposition 
that the prosecution is under an obligation to 
treat the defendant fairly; and that it cannot 
willfully suppress evidence favorable to him 
for the purpose of obtaining evidence favorable 
to him for the purpose of obtaining a conviction. 
However, as will be seen from what has been said 
above, there was no abuse of that principle. The 
defendant and his counsel were aware of what had 
happened; and there was no suppression of evidence 
involved. 
Id. at 91. In the case of State v. Cook, Kan., 589 P.2d 616 
(1979), the court.found that the trial judge did not commit 
error in refusing to dismiss a case where the prosecutor had 
failed to disclose exculpatory information. In doing so the 
court indicated: 
-13-
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Moreover evidence not disclosed to 
the defendant before trial is not suppressed 
or withheld by the state if the defendant 
has personal knowledge thereof, or if the 
facts become available to him during trial 
and he is not prejudiced in defending 
against these new facts. . • The test in 
these cases is whether the defendant's rights 
were prejudiced. 
In King v. Oklahoma, Okla., 586 P.2d 756 (1978), 
cert. den. 440 U.S. 965 (1979), the prosecutor had told 
the defense counsel that a witness would not be able to 
identify the defendant. When the witness testified, she 
identified the defendant. In holding that it was not error 
to deny a motion for mistrial, the court said: 
As his first assignment of error, 
defendant alleges that the trial judge erred 
by refusing to grant defendant's motion for 
mistrial when Alice Lane identified the defendant 
in court as one of the burglars. Defendant 
asserts that the prosecution had! in answer 
to his question as to whether there would be 
an in court identification, assured him there 
would be none and that the resulting identification 
was, therefore, surprise; and as a result counsel 
for the defense was unprepared to counteract 
the prejudicial effect of the identification, 
thus severely impeding defense counsel in 
representing defendant. . . Although the 
positive identification at trial by Alice Lane 
was an unexpected occurrence to defense counsel, 
we do not deem such to come within the definition 
of surprise. Witness Lane was endorsed upon the 
information, thus giving counsel notice that 
she would be testifying against the defendant. 
It was counsel's responsibility to interview the 
witnesses endorsed upon the information and to 
discern the nature and extent of their testimony. 
Over three months' time from the date of the 
preliminary hearing until the date of trial was 
available to counsel to discover the testimony 
of Alice Lane. 
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The appellant has claimed that the failure of 
Detective Johnson and the prosecutor to inform him of 
incriminating evidence was so prejudicial that appellant's 
trial counsel was competely unprepared to discredit the witness 
or rebut her testimony (Appellant's Brief, p. 16). A review 
of the record in this matter reveals nothing could be 
further from the truth. The appellant was aware of substantial! 
all of the evidence presented at trial from the date of the 
preliminary hearing (May 8, 1979). At that time he knew or 
should have known that the only issue at trial would be the 
identity of the rapist. He knew that the state's evidence 
would include the fact that the wallet of the appellant was 
found at the scene of the rape, that a piece of paper was 
found at the scene of the rape which had the appellant's 
telephone number on it, and that appellant had admitted to 
Connie Riley that he had been in the apartment of the victim 
at the time of the rape. At preliminary hearing he also 
knew that scientific tests had been taken on soil samples 
taken from the victim's residence and from the appellant's 
residence and that the appellant's hair had been compared 
with hair left at the scene. He knew the names of the 
persons who condueted these tests and the results of each 
test; some of which were favorable to the accused. He also 
knew that a report was made that his wallet had been taken 
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from him in a robbery, which alleged theft was reported by 
the appellant's mother some 10 to 15 minutes after the 
assailant left Deana English's apartment. 
The record clearly reflects that the appellant 
was aware of virtually all of the evidence that was 
presented at trial some seven months in advance. Very 
few defendants have been so fully aware of the evidence 
prior to trial. 
This Court, in State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 
{1980), made several observations about preliminary 
hearings that are relevant.to this case: 
(1) That the prosecution is not required to 
introduce enough evidence to establish the defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must present a quantum 
of evidence sufficient to warrant submission of the case to 
the trier of fact. 
(2) That the fundamental purpose served by the 
preliminary examination is to ferret out groundless arid 
improvident prosecutions. 
(3) That the ancillary purposes of effectively 
advising the defendant of the nature of the State's case 
against him and of providing a discovery device in which 
the defendant is able to discover and preserve favorable 
evidence are also provided by the preliminary examination. 
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Respondent submits that the prosecution established 
sufficient evidence to warrant submission of the case to the 
trial of fact, that the prosecution's case was neither 
groundless nor improvident, appellant was provided through 
the preliminary hearing with a discovery device enabling 
him to discover and preserve favorable evidence, and 
that he was informed at the preliminary hearing of the 
nature of the State's case against him (see analysis, 
supra). 
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In effect, the appellant has contended that he 
could not effectively deal with these disclosures because 
he was surprised. The case law in Utah has consistently 
been that the defense cannot claim surprise from newly 
discovered evidence where reasonable diligence would have 
dislosed the information. State v. Hawkins, 81 Utah 16, 
16 P.2d 713 (1932); State v. Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P.2d 
167 (1931). In addition, this Court has recently determined, 
in Anderson v. Bradley, Utah, 590 P.2d 339 (1979) that 
surprise, as grounds for a new trial, is only that which 
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. In this 
case appellant's trial counsel had more than seven months 
to investigate after he became aware of the fact that the 
appellant had admitted to being in the victim's apartment. 
He was aware of all of the witnesses to the conversation 
wherein defendant admitted to being in the apartment. All 
of the witnesses were available to be questioned prior to 
trial. Two of the witnesses (the appellant and Mrs. Workman) 
were certainly sympathetic to the appellant. Certainly it 
was the obligation of appellant's trial counsel to question 
those witnesses as to the entire conversation. He apparently 
failed to do so. Now he cannot complain that he did not 
find what he clearly could have found had he taken reasonable 
steps to investigate. 
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Additionally, prior knowledge of the appellant's 
admission would not have put appellant in any better position 
with respect to confronting the evidence presented. The 
testimony was that appellant had admitted a rape. Three 
witnesses, appellant, his brother, and his mother were 
parties to telephone conversations with Mrs. Riley wherein 
the rape was discussed. Appellant's counsel could easily have 
tested whether Mrs. Riley was telling the truth, since the 
conversations either occurred as Mrs. Riley testified or 
they did not. All that appellant's trial counsel would have 
had to do would have been to call appellant's mother, and 
ask her whether she had had a conversation with Mrs. Riley 
in which she (Mrs. Workman) told Mrs. Riley that appellant 
had raped a woman. Certainly appellant's mother could 
testify as to whether she had ever made such a statement 
about her son, and the evidence as presented could thereby 
have been effectively dealt with. 
The record in this case shows clearly that appellant 
had knowledge of the fact that the state would introduce 
evidence that Mrs. Riley talked to appellant within hours 
of the rape. Appellant knew that she would place him inside 
the residence at tbe time of the rape. Appellant had access 
to at least two witnesses to that conversation, and his 
failure to discover the entire conversation cannot be excused. 
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In addition, appellant at trial had all the witnesses 
available to him that were needed to deal effectively with 
the admission. Prior knowledge of the admission would not 
have put appellant in any better position with regard to 
confronting the evidence presented. It cannot be alleged 
that appellant's trial counsel could not effectively deal 
with the testimony presented at trial by Mrs. Riley as to 
appellant's confession. Appellant not only had an effective 
way to deal with this evidence, but he also had other 
evidence available to him such as the alibi witness, the 
hair and soil samples, and the reported robbery of the 
wallet, which he chose not to present. The decision not 
to put on his defense was a calculated choice designed to 
gain sympathy for appellant's position that he was denied 
his defense. 
POINT III 
.APPELLANT MAY NOT AVAIL HIMSELF OF THE 
BENEFIT OF CASE LAW DEALING WITH PROS-
ECUTORIAL USE OF KNOWN FALSE TESTIMONY 
AT TRIAL, OR WITH THE APPLICATION OF THE 
DISCOVERY RULES OF RULE 16(a), FEDERAL 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE BECAUSE OF 
THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THESE MATTERS TO 
THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE. 
Appellant characterizes the testimony of Detective 
Johnson, given at the preliminary hearing, as false testimony 
in that it did not allude to the circumstances of the rape 
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itself. Respondent contends that this testimony is, 
at most, incomplete, and does not reach the level of 
false testimony. Instructive in this regard is the case 
of Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973), in 
which the United States Supreme Court determined that 
the federal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, did not 
reach a witness' answer that was literally true, but 
unresponsive, even assuming that the witness intends to 
mislead the questioner by his answer, and even assuming 
the answer is arguably false by negative implication. The 
Court determined that any special problems arising from 
the literally true but unresponsive answer are to be 
remedied not through a federal perjury prosecution but 
through the questioner's acuity. The Court stated: 
Under the pressures and tensions of 
interrogation, it is not uncommon for 
the most earnest witness to give answers 
that are not entirely responsive. Some-
times the witness does not understand 
the question, or may in an excess of 
caution or apprehension read too much 
or too little into it .•• It is the 
responsibility of the lawyer to probe; 
testimonial interrogation, and cross-
examination in particular, is a probing, 
prying, pressing form of inquiry. 409 
U.S. at 358. 
Is also instructive that a vast majority of courts 
which have considered the question have held that perjury or 
false swearing cannot be based on a reply which, although 
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incomplete, misleading, or unresponsive, is literally true 
or technically accurate. This rule is said to apply even 
if the person who made the statement withheld purposely 
part of the truth concerning the matter asked, or if for 
devious reasons the statement was intentionally misleading, 
or was shrewdly evasive, thereby conveying false information 
by implication. 69 ALR 3d 993 (1976). 
In the case of In re Rosoto, 112 Cal.Rptr. 641, 
519 P.2d 1065 (1974) cert. den. 419 U.S. 897 (1974), the 
California Supreme Court held that where a witness' answers 
(in this case the witness was the chief investigator of the 
district attorney) which are literally true may cause a 
misleading impression due to the failure of counsel to ask 
more specific questions, the witness may not be faulted for 
failing to volunteer more explicit information, and the 
witness' failure to volunteer testimony to avoid the misleading 
impression does not constitute perjury, because the crucial 
element of falsity is not present in his testimony. 
Detective Johnson's answer to the question of 
appellant's counsel was literally true, and contained no 
element of falsity. Further, appellant's trial counsel knew 
that his client was charged with rape. It would have been 
a simple matter for him to follow up his question to Detective 
Johnson with another question as to whether appellant had 
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' 
admitted the rape· to Mrs. Riley. Appellant himself knew 
what his statement to Mrs. Riley entailed. He may not 
now, at this late date, attempt to avail himself of those 
cases dealing with deliberate deception of court and jury 
by the prosecution through the knowing presentation of 
false testimony, where there is no showing of the presen-
tation by the prosecution of known false testimony. A 
brief summary of the principal cases cited by appellant 
in this regard shows that they are inapposite to the instant 
matter. 
In Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) a habeas 
corpus petitioner charged that the State of California held 
him in confinement without due process of law. He alleged 
that the sole basis of his conviction was perjured testimony, 
knowingly used by the prosecution to obtain his conviction. 
He also alleged that the prosecuting authorities deliberately 
suppressed evidence which would have impeached and refuted 
the testimony given against him (i.e. exculpatory evidence). 
The Supreme Court held that due process cannot be deemed 
satisfied if a state has contrived a conviction through the 
pretense of a trial which is used as a means of depriving 
a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of a 
court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be 
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perjured. The facts in Mooney are easily distinguished 
from those of the instant case. Here, there was no perjured 
testimony presented by the prosecution either at the preliminary 
hearing or at trial. The information allegedly suppressed 
was inculpatory in nature, and, at trial there was no 
suppression of any evidence whatsoever by the prosecution. 
In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the 
Supreme Court determined that a conviction obtained through 
the use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives 
of the State is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
that the same result obtains when the State, not having 
solicited false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when 
it appears. In the instant case, there was no false evidence 
presented by the prosecution, therefore the prosecution was 
not guilty of allowing false evidence to go uncorrected. 
In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), 
the defense counseldiscovered subsequent to trial that the 
Government at trial failed to disclose an alleged promise 
of leniency made to its key witness in return for his 
testimony. The Assistant United States Attorney who presented 
the case to the grand jury admitted that he promised the 
witness that he (the witness) would not be prosecuted if he 
testified before the grand jury and at trial. The Assistant 
Attorney General who tried the case was unaware of the 
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promise. At trial, the informant flatly denied the existence 
of any such agreement. The Court held that the prosecution's 
duty to present all material evidence to the ~ was not 
fulfilled by the nondisclosure, and that therefore due process 
was violated. In the instant case, there was no false 
testimony given either at the prelirainary hearing or at the 
trial, therefore Giglio is completely distinguishable on its 
facts from the instant matter. 
Appellant's attempted reliance on the case of 
United States v. Pascual, 606 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1979) is 
also inappropriate, partic11larly in light of the facts of 
the instant case. In Pascual, the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, in particular Rule 16(a), were operative and 
applicable; in the instant matter they were not. The 
magistrate in Pascual entered a standing discovery order; 
in appellant's case, no standing discovery order was entered. 
Finally, the decision in Pascual was dependent not only on 
the fact of non-disclosure of the defendant's letter in 
violation of Rule 16(a), but also on the fact that defendant's 
letter incriminated two co-defendants by name where nothing 
in the record showed that they had knowledge of the letter 
prior to its presentation at trial. Appellant knew of his 
own statement, and it affected only himself. 
In United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) cert. den. 429 U.S. 924 (1976), the Court of Appeals 
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for the District of Columbia had occasion to interpret 
pertinent provisions of Rule 16(a). The court determined 
that under rule 16(a), which allows defendants to inspect 
and copy or photograph any relevant written or recorded 
statements or confessions made "by the defendant" within 
the possession, custody or control of the Government, the 
phrase "by the defendant" requires not that the statement 
at issue be attributed to the defendant, but that the 
statement be obtained by the Government directly from 
the defendant without intervention of any third party. 
Under this interpretation, even if Rule 16{a) were applicable 
in the instant matter, appellant's undisclosed confession 
would not fall under its protection, as his statement was 
not obtained by the state directly from him, but was obtained 
through Mrs. Riley. 
The case of State v. Hiteshaw, Ore., 476 P.2d 935 
(1970), is also inapplicable to the instant case, particularly 
because in Hiteshaw not only was there a written discovery 
order requiring the state to explicitly disclose the defendant's 
admissions, but there was also evidence of trickery on the 
part of police officers in getting the admissions from the 
defendant to convict him. Here, there was no written discovery 
order, nor was there any misconduct in getting the appellant's 
confession. 
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Finally, petitioner's reliance on State v. Brown, 
Idaho, 560 P.2d 880 (1977) is misplaced, in light of the 
recent decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Horn, 
Idaho, 610 P.2d 551 (1980) that the prosecutor is only 
required to disclose information favorable to the defendant 
and material to either defendant's guilt or punishment in 
a criminal prosecution. 
CONCLUSION 
~ppellant made no showing that he was prejudiced 
by the alleged failure of the prosecution to disclose his 
confession under standards enunciated by the United States 
Supreme Court and by this Court, due process is not violated 
by the failure of the prosecution to disclose a defendant's 
inculpatory statements, particularly where the defendant has 
personal knowledge of the statements and is not prejudiced 
thereby. 
For these reasons, respondent prays that this 
Court affirm the conviction of appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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